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by
ANNE HARDY*
THE decline ofsmallpox in Britain in the nineteenth century has long been recognized
as a feature of the history of mortality in that period. The Royal Commission on
Smallpox and Fever Hospitals of 1882, for example, traced the beginnings of this
decline as far back as the 1780s.' Contemporaries, and historians subsequently,
generally accepted that vaccination and its variants were the cause of the decline.
Peter Razzell has suggested that "virtually all ofthe population" in the first halfofthe
nineteenth century was protected by either vaccination or inoculation.2 Others are
more cautious: Thomas McKeown, with reservations, appears to accept the view of
"most epidemiologists" that vaccination was responsible for the decline of the
disease.3 Gwendoline Ayers noted that while the "ebb of classical smallpox" in
England can be traced as a long-term decline with peaks, the reasons for its final
disappearance as a native disease have been "variously and incompletely assessed".4
Cyril Dixon, in his authoritativeSmallpox, is even morecautious, seeming to suggest a
decline in thevirulence ofthe native smallpox strain, followed, in the early years ofthe
twentieth century, by the emergence on the American continent of a very mild strain
of the disease, variola minor, which eventually superseded the more deadly, and
hitherto dominant, variola major. I More recently, Stuart Fraser has described small-
pox prevention in Leicester, "probably the first" community in which "measures
other than vaccination wereintroduced successfully to eradicatethedisease".6
Three elements can thus be discerned in attempting to explain the decline of the
disease. First, variations in the virulence ofthevirus strain; second, vaccination; third,
measures other than vaccination taken to control the spread ofthe disease. Ofthese,
the question ofvirulence must in the first instance be important, even though the long
confusion of smallpox and chickenpox makes accuracy difficult.7 Razzell, following
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on the work of McVail in 1919, observes a "gradual but highly significant increase in
the virulence and case-fatality rate of smallpox from the late seventeenth through to
the end of the nineteenth century"." Creighton, in 1894, remarked on a similar
pattern, although he saw the increase as beginning in the late seventeenth century, and
the epidemic of 1837-40 as "the last in England which showed smallpox in its old
colours".9 Thu Royal Commission on Vaccination, in its Final Report of 1896,
declared the generally accepted contemporary view to be that "smallpox, introduced
from the East", began to be common in Western Europe during the fifteenth century,
though perhaps existing still earlier, that it increased during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and was very prevalent in the eighteenth century.'0 From their
study of the London Bills of Mortality, the Commissioners concluded that although
the disease was endemic in the capital in the eighteenth century, it retained an
epidemic character, the returns in some years being much greater than in others." The
Commissioners were well aware ofthe drawbacks ofthe Bills as a statistical source,'2
but they claimed also to have learnt from "the incidental elements ofvarious authors"
that the fatality of the disease varied much in different years: epidemics were often
spoken of as being either mild or malignant; in some epidemics many people were
attacked, and the proportion ofdeaths was small; in others the disease was fatal to a
large number ofthose attacked.'3
The general consensus suggests that smallpox was not originally a native disease in
England, although opinion varies as to the period at which the disease became
endemic. Razzell, for example, accepts that smallpox was a young child's disease, and
therefore "more or less endemic" in most large towns by the early seventeenth
century,"4 while Dixon is more wary of the evidence which Razzell accepts.'5
Certainly, smallpox was by no means only a child's disease at this time. By the late
seventeenth century also, contemporaries were observing that smallpox was markedly
more fatal than in the past."6 Recent medical research, discussed in detail by Razzell,
indicates the existence of a variety of smallpox viruses, varying in virulence and with
specific regional character.'7 Razzell suggests that, "The most likely explanation of
the increase in fatality is that more virulent strains ofsmallpox were being introduced
into the country with the growth ofworld trade.... With the growth of world trade,
virulent viruses would drive out the less virulent ones .. .".1' These findings are of
interest in the light of past observations: Dixon, for example, noting that "from
1695-1710 smallpox was at a low ebb", remarks that, "as Creighton suggests, a state
ofwar in Europe on more than one occasion produced a low incidence [ofthe disease]
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in England. This supports the view that smallpox was frequently being imported into
thecountry......b
Although the origins ofsmallpox are unknown,20the evidence seems to suggest that
the "native" or established strain of the disease in England, and perhaps in Europe,
was a mild one. Thegradual increase in virulence until 1870charted by McVail and by
Razzell may thus be associated with the greater mobility of goods and population
which developed within and beyond Europe from the later fifteenth century.
Throughout the eighteenth century, for example, the "native" strain ofthe disease in
England was probably constantly refreshed from outside. By the 1780s, however, the
fatality of the disease may have been mitigated by widespread inoculation,2' while
difficulty oftravel and trade dislocation consequent on war in Europe and on the high
seas may have interrupted the introduction ofseverer strains. Dixon notes that large-
scale outbreaks ofthedisease only began to re-occur in 1817-19.22 During thefirst half
of the nineteenth century, generally, the smallpox strain present in Europe seems to
have been a very mild one. Except during the epidemic of 1837-40 the smallpox
mortality rate per thousand living fell (Table 1), although the case-fatality rate, as
shown in the record ofthe London Smallpox Hospital, rose (Table 2). Nevertheless,
observers from the mid-century on looked back to the relative mildness ofthedisease
in these years.
TABLE 1: SMALLPOX MORTALITY RATE, 1771-188023
Period Perthousandliving
1771-80 5
1801-10 2
1811-35 0.83
1837-40 2.3
1841-50 0.40
1851-60 0.28
1861-70 0.28
1871-80 0.46
TABLE 2: CASE-FATALITY RATE AT LONDON SMALLPOX HOSPITAL24
Period Total Cases Percentage Deaths
1746-63 6456 25+
1776-1800 7017 32
,Tl 1836-51 2654 38
By the later 1850s, however, there were signs of a change: the disease was
apparently gaining in virulence. Dr Munk, ofthe London Smallpox Hospital, told the
Royal Commission in 1882 that each successive smallpox epidemic in the nineteenth
century had been more severe, with a greater case-mortality:2' the London medical
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officers ofhealth, appointed in 1855, were quick to note the change in thecharacter of
the disease. The MOH for St. James's, Westminster, for example, noted that the
epidemic of 1860-1 was "one ofthe greatest attacks ofsmallpox that has been known
since the days of Jenner".2' His colleague for Mile End Old Town recorded that the
disease has been "so long in abeyance" that, "we had almost ceased to look upon its
existence as a matter ofmoment"." These reactions may have been based on the fact
that, in this epidemic, the eruption was generally semi-confluent; the case-mortality
was apparently low.28 Nevertheless, there was a significant change from the
"comparatively tare and mild disorder" evoked by John Syer Bristowe in 1858.29 The
report ofthe London Smallpox Hospital for 1864 stated the epidemic of 1862-3 to be
the "severest in the memory ofthe present generation" in respect of both numbers of
cases and their severity and fatality-rate; in 1866, both the number of cases admitted
and their mortality wereeven greater.30
The reappearance of a more fatal form of smallpox helped to dispel any illusions
contemporary medical observers might have had as to the practicality of eradicating
the disease solely through universal vaccination. When vaccination was originally
introduced, it had been asserted that it gave the same protection as inoculation,
without the danger ofspreading the disease.3' It appeared to offer a simpler and surer
method ofexterminating smallpox than the isolation methods advocated by Haygarth
and others at the end of the eighteenth century, and these consequently were
abandoned, while vaccination became the "State-adopted" method ofdealing with the
disease.32 Already in the 1830s, however, public apathy towards the operation was
causing concern to interested persons. In his first letter to the Registrar-General,
William Farr observed that when the poorer classes did not neglect vaccination
altogether, they often deferred it for years, and that vaccination was too long delayed
by all classes." In 1848, after the first, voluntary, Vaccination Act, when smallpox
was present in many districts across thecountry, neglect ofvaccination was referred to
by several registrars, for example at Leicester, Stockport, Wycombe, and
Yarmouth.3' Although the figures for the London Smallpox Hospital show that the
percentage of vaccinated individuals among those admitted rose steadily from 32 per
cent in 1825 to 72.85 per cent in 1856,35 these figures are probably misleading as a
general guide to the vaccination state of the population, since the element of panic
protection in threatened households must be taken into account. John Simon, in his
official survey of the subject, noted how the number of vaccinations had fallen off, in
26 Medical Officer's Report; St James's, Westminster, 1862, p. 12. The annual reports of the London
Medical Officers of Health are deposited in the GLC History Library, County Hall, London SEI, and are
quoted by permission.
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spite ofthe 1853 Vaccination Act, since the last epidemic ofthe disease had passed.36
The absence ofthe disease removed any urgency for protection.
Although it is possible that inoculation was widely practised before being made
illegal in 1840, Razzell's suggestion that "virtually all" of the population in the first
half of the nineteenth century were either vaccinated or inoculated must be treated
with caution. Simon spoke ofthe "mere indifference" ofuneducated persons as being
the principal obstacle to universal infant vaccination:"7 such indifference seems
unlikely to have distinguished between vaccination and inoculation. Further, the
possible consequences of inoculation in producing an eruption probably also
militated against the use of the operation among the uneducated urban classes at
least. In 1859, for example, the MOH for Whitechapel recorded a "deep-rooted" pre-
judice against vaccination "strongly manifested" in poor neighbourhoods wherever a
child had suffered some eruptive disease "syphilitic, eczematous, etc., commonly
associated with teething" after vaccination.33 Such prejudice, with good foundation in
both cases, probably extended to inoculation.3'
In spite ofdoubts about the quality ofnineteenth-century vaccination,." the crucial
role ofthe operation in bringing about thedecline ofsmallpox during the course ofthe
century cannot be disputed. Vaccination greatly reduced the number of susceptibles
and, by providing the preventive organization with a means of limiting the spread of
the disease, was a prerequisite for the success of further control techniques. Yet
vaccination alone was not entirely responsible for the reduction in smallpox mortality.
The general assumption, for many years after the introduction of the operation, that
its universal extension would rapidly eradicate the disease, meant that preventive
efforts wereentirely directed towards this end. Thecompulsory Vaccination Acts were
the concrete expression of this belief. As noted above, however, informed con-
temporaries were becoming aware in the 1840s and 1850s that "uniformly thorough
infantile vaccination"'41 nationally was going to be virtually impossible to achieve: the
pockets of resistance and indifference were difficult to overcome. The 1872 Vaccina-
tion Act, which established national vaccination policy until 1898, and which has been
accounted one ofthe great success stories ofVictorian public health administration,42
was not 100 per cent effective. Even in its first, and most effective, decade of opera-
tion, 7.68 per cent of births in London and 4.2 per cent in the rest of the country
remained unaccounted for in respect ofvaccination.
Yet the Vaccination Acts were, given their limitations, and the circumstances of
nineteenth-century urban life that facilitated or even encouraged their evasion,
notably successful. Edward Seaton, in his analysis ofthe 1870-1 epidemic, pointed out
that in theyears following the 1853 Act, the length oftime between national epidemics
of smallpox increased.43 Although the case-fatality of the "natural" smallpox in the
36 John Simon, Papers on thehistoryandpractice ofvaccination, PP. 1857, session 2, XXV, p. 225.
37 Ibid.
"I Medical Officer's quarterly report: Whitechapel, 1859, p. 6.
39Smith, op. cit., note I above, p. 162.
40 Ibid., pp. 162-163.
41 Simon, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 195.
42 Royston Lambert, 'A Victorian national health service', Hist. J., 1962, 5: 1-18.
43Annualreport ofthe Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1875, XL, p. 52.
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1870-1 epidemic was nearly double that accepted as normal for the disease (67.5 per
cent as against 35 per cent), the mortality proportionate to population was less than
two-thirds of the mortality of 1837-40." The success ofthe Acts is also demonstrated
by the remarkable shift in the age-incidence of the disease. Up until 1853, smallpox
deaths at under five years ofage constituted 75 per cent ofthe total; between 1853 and
1871, the under-fives averaged 55 per cent of the total; in 1871-2 this fell to 31 per
cent.45 In the years 1881-90, the under-fives' smallpox mortality was reduced to 25 per
cent ofthe total; in 1891-1900, it rose again slightly to 31 per cent.46
TABLE 3: DEATHS FROM SMALLPOX AT CERTAIN AGE-PERIODS TO 1,000
DEATHS FROM SMALLPOX AT ALL AGES47
Period Under 1 1-5 5-10 10-IS 15-25 25-45 45+
1848-54 251 426 130 33 75 67 18
1855-9 231 328 144 37 117 112 31
1860-4 237 313 108 42 123 133 44
1865-9 231 314 103 33 126 145 48
1870-4 143 169 140 58 200 224 66
1875-9 112 129 113 72 218 266 90
1880-4 113 122 98 68 216 286 97
1885-9 112 81 54 51 229 344 129
1890-4 166 117 50 26 131 338 172
The pattern of infant smallpox mortality in the latter part of the century closely
follows that of the effectiveness of the 1872 Vaccination Act. The vaccination records
kept and published by John Simon's office from 1872 onwards, show that in the first
decade of its operation, the proportion of children born annually who remained
unaccounted for in respect of vaccination averaged 7.68 per cent in London, 4.2 per
cent in the rest of England and Wales. In the decade 1882-91, this disparity was less
marked: 8.6 per cent in London, 7.5 per cent elsewhere. In the last decade of the
.century, however, these percentages rose strikingly, in anticipation of the findings of
the Vaccination Commission,' to a peak of33 per cent in London in 1898, and of22.3
per cent in the rest ofthe country in 1896.49
Nevertheless, infant vaccination, as provided for in the Acts, could not in the long
term fully protect an adult population for whom re-vaccination was entirely
voluntary. In an uncertain number ofcases also, the operation as originally performed
was not satisfactory. John Simon observed in 1857 that there was current in England
and Wales. ". . . not only an appreciable amount of utterly incompetent vaccination,
but a very considerable proportion ofsecond rate vaccination."50
In 1857, Seaton explained the deaths, in the 1870-1 epidemic, of nine to ten
thousand adults who "in a rough and ready way" must be taken as vaccinated, as
,"Ibid.,p. 53.
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being due to vaccination not being "thoroughly and efficiently" performed."' There
thus existed, throughout the country, but particularly in London, a large concourse of
poorly protected adults, and a "pabulum" of adults and children who had escaped
vaccination altogether. Figures for vaccinations occurring in higher age-groups are
unobtainable for most of this period, but in 1899, 81,038 were performed in England
and Wales, of which 11,693 were in London.52 Even so, the "pabulum" was likely to
be significant.
The extent to which vaccination mitigated the severity of smallpox was discussed
with great interest by contemporaries, despite recognized difficulties with vaccination
statistics collected where the disease was present. It was said, for example, that the
confusion which the eruption of an epidemic occasioned in the smallpox hospitals
made the statistical collection procedures unreliable." Further, in nearly all fatal
cases a profuse eruption tended to hide vaccination scars ifthey existed, and observa-
tions by nurses and doctors in these circumstances were not reliable.54 Such criticism
was to some extent met by the "doubtfully vaccinated" category which began to
appear in, for example, the Metropolitan Asylums Board's tables from the later
1880s, but these qualifications must be borne in mind in this context, as in discussions
ofcase-mortality. Such cautions apart, it was almost impossible to gauge the extent of
protection conferred by previous vaccination on a national scale. Of a total of 4,058
smallpox deaths registered in England and Wales in the decade 1891-1900, only 34
per cent of medical certificates stated vaccination condition. In the previous decade,
44 per cent did so. In this respect, medical practitioners in London were more con-
scientious, or bolder in their assessments, than their provincial colleagues: in London,
the proportion of fatal cases reported without statement as to vaccination condition
was not more than 30 per cent, in the provinces it exceeded 70 percent.55
Local and individual hospital studies therefore constitute the only, patchy, source
for the study ofthis question. Seaton, for example, among various other cases, cited a
"careful study" by the MOH for Merthyr Tydfil, which showed that the death rate
among "vaccinated" smallpox patients diminished in proportion to the number of
vaccination scars.56
TABLE 4: SMALLPOX VICTIMS IN MERTHYR TYDFIL, 1870-1
No. scars: 1 2 3 4 4+ Unvaccinated
Death-rate %: 8.5 6 3.7 1.5 0 51.1
Thirty years later, it was noted that in the decade 1891-1900, in the metropolitan
hospitals, 30 per cent ofsmallpox deaths were ofpersons said to be vaccinated; in the
provinces only 12 per cent. In the former, the vaccinated were said to constitute 40 per
5" PP. 1875, XL, appendix 5, p. 88.
52Annualreport ofMedicalOfficer: Local Government Board, PP. 1901, XXVI, p. 23.
53 PP. 1896, XLVII, p. 179.
'4 Ibid.
55 Sixty-fifth annualreport ofthe Registrar-General, PP. 1905, XVIII, supplement, part 1, p. 75.
56pp. 1875, XL, appendix 5, p. 91.
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cent ofcases, in the latter, 18 per cent." In the years 1881-90, before thegreat decline
in infant vaccination set in, it was estimated that for every child with vaccination scars
attacked by smallpox, there were 82 who had none. Mortality among the former was
nil per million, among the latter, 525 per million.58 The implications of such studies
were taken seriously by those concerned with prevention: the London MOHs, from
the earliest days oftheir appointment, used the modifying effects of vaccination as a
principal weapon in their efforts to extend vaccination among the population."9 As late
as 1896, and despite the reservations outlined above, the Royal Commission on
Vaccination offered the following analysis of mild or severe smallpox according to
vaccination condition:60
TABLE 5: SMALLPOX CHARACTERISTICS AND VACCINATION
IN THE EPIDEMICS OF 1887-8, 1892-3
City Condition % Milder Cases % Severer Cases
Sheffield { Vaccinated 82.8: 17.2
Sheffield 1. Unvaccinated 18.5 81.5
D Vaccinated 82.0 18.0
Dewsbury 1. Unvaccinated 23.1 76.9
Vaccinated 81.4 18.6
Leicester I.*Unvaccinated 27.2 72.8
Warrington Vvaccinated 78.2 21.8
Warrington 1.Unvaccinated 29.4 70.6
In all analyses of nineteenth-century smallpox data, some allowance should be
made for incorrect diagnosis. Such cases undoubtedly did occur, and are mentioned
occasionally in local preventive records.61 Despite possible lingering confusion
between smallpox and chickenpox, and the Registrar-General's failure to distinguish
between the two until 1854, there are indications that this problem is more likely to
affect figures from the closing years of the century, when the younger generation of
doctors became increasingly unfamiliar with the disease, than earlier in the period,
when it was much more widespread. In 1898, for example, the increasing proportion
of misdiagnosed cases arriving at the hospitals of the Metropolitan Asylums Board
led the latter's Statistical Committee to remark that, "It is evident that the ordinary
practitioner in London practically never sees smallpox or typhus".'2 The MAB's
figures for mistaken diagnosis provide an indication of the extent of the diagnostic
problem and its changing pattern. The authority first seems to have become aware of
misdiagnosis as a problem in 1891, in which year it observed that errors in diagnosis of
patients sent to the hospitals had increased in the past five years from 2.4 per cent to
57 Annual report ofthe Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1905, XVIII, supplement, part 1,
p.75.
58 Annualreport ofthe MedicalOfficerfor London, 1900, p. 18.
59Medical Officers' annual reports: Mile End Old Town, 1859, p. 8; Shoreditch, 1859-60, p. 18; St
George-in-the-East, 1876, p. 46.
6 PP. 1896, XLVII, p.69.
61 Camberwell Vestry, Sewers andSanitary Committee minutes, (John Harvard Library), 17 September
1895.
62 Annualreport oftheStatistical Committeeofthe Metropolitan Asylums Board, 1898, p. 30.
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6.2 per cent.63 Thereafter, the Board kept increasingly detailed records of mis-
diagnosed cases.
TABLE 6: MISDIAGNOSED CASES ATTHE METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD
HOSPITALS"
Year Misdiagnosespercent Misdiagnosespercent of
oftotaladmissions smallpoxcases admitted
1887 2.4 not available
1891 6.2 not available
1892 4.4 6.3
1893 3.9 3.3
Admitted to Patients at
hospital ships South Wharf
1894 5.2 0.8 12.2
Fever Cases
1895 7.6 0.5 11.3
1896 5.3 1.5 28.7
1897 6.02 2.8 42.9
1898 7.2 I case of5 83.3
1899 6.3 0 64.3
1900 7.8 0 32.0
1901 9.2 0 13.3
1902 8.6 0 7.7
1903 20.4 0 18.2
This pattern of misdiagnoses suggests that the MAB were probably right in their
assessment of the reasons behind it. The diminishing number of smallpox cases
notified in the years 1895-1899, combined with continuing anxiety about invasions of
thedisease, may have driven themisdiagnosis level up. The fall in mis-diagnosed cases
in 1901 coincides with a marked increase in notifications in that year.
TABLE 7: SMALLPOX CASES NOTIFIED IN LONDON,
UNCORRECTED FOR MISDIAGNOSIS 1890-1903"3
1890 60 1895 979 1900 87
1891 114 1896 225 1901 1,700
1892 423 1897 104 1902 7,796
1893 2,813 1898 32 1903 416
1894 1,192 1899 29
The records of the Metropolitan Asylums Board show that, while smallpox con-
tinued to be present in London in the 1890s, it had become much less serious in
character than earlier in the century, and this was reflected both in the annual
aggregate admissions, and in the case-fatality figures (see Table 13)." Creighton, in
his classic account of the history of the disease in England up to 1893, summarized
that history as follows: ". . . it first left the richerclasses, then it left the villages, then it
63Ibid., 1891, p. 13.
" Ibid., 1891-1903.
, Ibid.
" Ibid., 1903,p. 27.
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left the provincial towns to centre itself in the capital; at the same time it was leaving
the age of infancy and childhood ... dying ... gradually, from the extremities to the
heart."67 Creighton's remarks on this, as on other aspects ofthe decline ofthe disease
in his day, can be misleading. For example, his account of the shift in the age-
incidence of the disease nowhere mentions the element of infant vaccination.
Nevertheless, from the vantage-point of 1894, his model ofthe geographical decline of
the disease is acceptable. The mortality pattern set out in the Registrar-General's
reports up to 1893 reveals smallpox constantly present in London (except in 1889) and
notably epidemic in the provinces.
Examination of the pattern of smallpox mortality given by the Registrar-General
for the years 1894-1910, and the study of the statistical reports of the MAB, suggest
that Creighton's model may be in need of some modification. The disease was very
sparsely present in the capital after 1888, except for the epidemic years, which con-
temporaries counted as 1892-5.6" During this period, there was very little smallpox in
the south-east of England,69 or in the rest of the country. In 1898-1900, the disease
was epidemic in Middlesbrough, Doncaster, and Sculcoates, in the York division. In
1901-2, when the disease in a "severe" form was epidemic in London, not only was
the provincial epidemic delayed in appearance, but the manifestation of the disease
was much milder; the London epidemic had come to an end by August 1902. At this
time, there was little smallpox in the provinces, except in certain ports in Lancashire,
the West Riding, and South Wales. In September, the disease began to grow in the
provinces, and by the end of the year was seriously affecting the North and West
Midlands, the North-West, and Yorkshire. Nevertheless, the notable feature of this
provincial epidemic was the "extraordinary mildness" ofthe disease, in which sense it
"'differed widely" from the type observed in London, and its "inferior infective
quality". This latter feature made the provincial epidemic more amenable to control
than the Metropolitan.70
The marked decline in smallpox mortality in both London, and England and Wales,
during the course of the nineteenth century, but particularly in the last decade of the
century, together with the startling reversal of London's pre-eminent mortality posi-
tion in that decade, can best be traced in comparative mortality figures:
TABLE 8: SMALLPOX MORTALITY PER MILLION LIVING IN
LONDON AND THE PROVINCES7'
Period: 1838-42 1847-9 1851-60 1861-70 1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900
London 755 460 280 276 457 145 10
Provinces 547 274 222 162 245 46 13
London's share of the annual aggregate of smallpox deaths is also of some interest.
The actual percentage of national smallpox mortality occurring in London varied
widely, and while a sustained increase in London's relative share of mortality can be
67 Creighton, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 617.
" McVail, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 3-4.
"Registrar-General's annualreports.
70 PP. 1904, XXVI, pp. xxxiii, xxxviii.
71 PP. 1886, XXXI, p. 485; PP. 1901, XV, Table 24, p. civ, Table 25, p. cv.
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seen in the years 1876-1885, the sharp decrease after 1885 is also clear (Table 9).
TABLE 9: SMALLPOX DEATHS IN LONDON, PER CENT OF SMALLPOX DEATHS
IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1854-190572
1854 24.71 1880 72.69
1855 45.63 1881 76.40
1856 23.32 1882 32.65
1857 3.96 1883 14.21
1858 3.75 1884 55.32
1859 30.09 1885 50.19
1886 8.73
1860 32.67 1887 1.78
1861 16.44 1888 0.87
1862 22.48 1889 0
1863 50.35
1864 7.12 1890 25.00
1865 9.98 1891 16.33
1866 45.92 1892 9.51
1867 53.52 1893 14.41
1868 29.09 1894 10.85
1869 17.57 1895 24.66
1896 1.66
1870 37.14 1897 64.00
1871 34.21 1898 0.40
1872 9.35 1899 1.72
1873 4.78
1874 2.64 1900 4.71
1875 4.84 1901 64.32
1876 30.56 1902 53.33
1877 59.63 1903 1.71
1878 76.34 1904 4.93
1879 83.95 1905 8.62
Thehistory ofsmallpox in the later years ofthe nineteenth century does not support
the contention that vaccination was fully or finally responsible for the eventual
disappearance of the disease in Britain. It was in these years, in fact, that there was
developed the system for control ofthedisease that became the basis ofthe successful
modern campaign for its eradication. By the mid-century, the early ideal of the
eradication ofthe disease by universal vaccination had been regretfully abandoned in
view of the difficulties of achieving this desirable state. In 1858, for example, the
Lancet noted that when smallpox appeared in a locality where vaccination had been
neglected, prompt and proper measures, such as the isolation of victims and the
vaccination of contacts, must be taken to prevent its spread. "No delay must be
tolerated now", thejournal emphasized, "days are ofmore importance than weeks at
any otherperiod."73.
There are no indications in the literature that the more virulent smallpox of
nThis table has been compiled from the figures given by the Registrar-General. After 1884, the figures
are corrected to include deaths from smallpox properly belonging to the London registration districts, but
occurring at the MABhospital ships in the Dartford registration district.
73 Lancet, 8 May 1858, p. 461.
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1859-66 was imported from abroad: however, it seems likely that the central medical
authority (the Medical Department ofthe Privy Council, at this timedirected by John
Simon) was not yet aware ofthe importance ofinternational connexions in transmitt-
ing the disease.74 Until after the cholera epidemic of 1866, and the epidemics ofcattle
plague and meningitis that so forcefully re-introduced the lesson ofinternational con-
nexion in that year, in the face of stubborn opposition from the medical
establishment,75 the references to foreign disease movements are no more than
passing. The reappearance of a more fatal form of smallpox nevertheless helped to
dispel any illusions that were still held as to the practicality oferadicating the disease
in the relatively short-term solely through vaccination, and the epidemic of
rinderpest, imported from Russia, which struck the country in 1865 provided in this
respect a stimulating example. It inspired Sir James Young Simpson, the dist-
inguished obstetrician and gynaecologist,76 to write one ofthe most influential preven-
tive essays of the period, 'A proposal to stamp out smallpox', published in 1868.77
Here, the elements ofsmallpox prevention which later came to constitute the so-called
"Leicester system" were laid out in detail.
Simpson's proposals for smallpox control were not strictly original, since he
suggested a return to the isolation policies of the previous century, but it was widely
accepted by contemporaries that his work was crucial in re-introducing the idea of
isolation to the preventive medical world.7' Simpson pointed out that, although a
stricter enforcement ofthe new compulsory vaccination law and a greater attention to
the proper performance of the operation with proper matter, would no doubt in time
diminish the susceptible group; in the meantime, smallpox "still revels with fatal
power among our population". Reliance on vaccination alone would not arrest the
progress of the disease, but vaccination supplemented by other measures might. He
pointed out that in the "last two or three years" the public mind had become
familiarized with the idea of "stamping out" a disease - the policy which had been
employed in eliminating the scourge of rinderpest.79 This was not to imply that the
destruction ofaffected individuals should be used to eliminate smallpox: in the human
context the parallel demonstrated that "isolation is the chief and leading measure
required to stamp out smallpox"." The rules for stamping out which Simpson
propounded were elementary in their simplicity: deceptively so in view ofthedifficulty
of implementing them in a Victorian city. The first essential was the earliest possible
notification ofcases; the second, the "seclusion" ofaffected individuals at home or in
hospital until all danger of infection was passed. Nurses and attendants must be
74The reports of the Medical Officer to the Privy Council, later to the Local Government Board, are
perhaps thebest sources fortracing developments in public health thinking in this period.
71 Sherwin A. Hall, 'Thecattle plague of 1865', Med. Hist., 1962, 6: 45-58.
76 Dictionaryofnational biography, vol. 18, p. 272.
77 Sir James Y. Simpson, 'A proposal to stamp out smallpox', Edinburgh, Edmonton and Douglas, 1868.
Theessay was first published in the Medical Times andGazette, 4 January 1868.
.7' Finalreport ofthe Royal Commission on Vaccination, PP. 1896, XLVII, p. 207; McVail, op. cit., note
8 above, p. 56.
7'Simpson, op. cit., note 77 above, p. 5. The phrase "stamping out" was first applied, in connexion with a
disease, to rinderpest. International Royal Agricultural Society, series 11, 1866, 1: 271; T. Gamgee, The
cattleplague, London, Robert Hardwicke, 1866, p. vi.
1° Simpson, op. cit., note 77 above, p. 6.
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vaccinated, and after the disease was over, all beds, sheets, clothing, utensils, bedrooms,
etc., must be thoroughly purified with water, chlorine, carbolic acid, and sulphurous
acid.8' Although Simpson did not mention the vaccination of contacts, perhaps
because this was not a measure which, in the existing state of the law, could be
enforced by preventive authorities, this quickly came into practice as part ofthe pre-
ventive package, so that vaccination or re-vaccination was offered, at least to
contacts.82
The effect of Simpson's pamphlet can clearly be seen in the changed tactics of the
London medical officers between 1863 and 1871. In the years 1859-64, their efforts
were chiefly directed towards publicizing vaccination.83 They published and issued
thousands of handbills and posters advertising the advantages of vaccination and re-
vaccination, and where these might be obtained; they went from house to house
through their districts, inquiring as to the vaccination state of the inhabitants, and
urging the operation where required. They personally examined thousands of
schoolchildren for evidence of vaccination, and supervised the cleansing and
whitewashing ofthe poorest houses and streets in the localities. By 1871, however, the
concentration on vaccination publicity had substantially diminished. Although posters
and handbills were issued in quantity (as they were in every major epidemic of com-
municable disease), the principal efforts of the sanitary departments focused on the
tracing of victims, and on preventive measures taken in response to identified cases.
These consisted in the isolation of the patient, or his removal to hospital where
possible; the tracing and vaccination ofcontacts; and the cleansing and disinfection of
all necessary rooms, furniture, clothes, and bedding. Many London authorities had
established disinfecting arrangements during the 1860s, and where this was not the
case, arrangements were hastily made in 1871 as the scale of the epidemic became
clear.
The endeavours of the medical officers to limit the spread ofthe disease by "other
methods" were assisted by theestablishment at this time ofthe Metropolitan Asylums
Board, and the erection of isolation hospitals under its management." The MAB
hospitals proved something of a mixed blessing in the areas in which they were
situated, since it soon became clear that the organization of staff, visitors, laundry,
and ambulances provided ample opportunities for infection ofthe population inhabit-
ing streets in the immediate (within half a mile radius) vicinity. Although the major
contemporary debate centred on the ability ofthe disease to travel distances by aerial
convection, it seems clear that it was spread largely by personal contact.85 The
experience ofthe epidemics of 1876-7, 1881, and 1884 served toconfirm that the loca-
tion ofhospitals for dangerous infectious diseases in built-up areas exposed the local
residents to too many risks. In 1884, the MAB removed all smallpox cases from the
"' Ibid.
32PP. 1864, XXVII, p. 110.
8' Annual reports ofMedical Officers: Camberwell, 1858-9; Lambeth, 1863; St Pancras, 1859; Islington,
1863; St Giles, 1859; Paddington, 1862-3.
u Ayers, op. cit., note 4 above, Chapter 10.
*5 Annual report of Medical Officer: Hackney, 1880, p. 16. For more recent evidence, see D. Baxby,
Jenner's smallpox vaccine: the riddle of vaccinia virus and its origin, London, Heinemann Educational,
1981, pp. 18-19, 23.
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city hospitals to newly-acquired hospital ships at Long Reach in the Thames Estuary.
Thereafter, not only did the number of smallpox deaths registered in the London
registration districts fall away in a most dramatic fashion, but London's position as
the harbour of endemic smallpox and principal source of infection for the rest ofthe
country was undermined.
The decline of smallpox in London cannot, however, be entirely ascribed to the
success of"other measures", as described above, even thehospital ships. Although the
activities ofthe London sanitary authorities in 1871 make it clear that the "Leicester
system", which was first instituted in 1877, was by no means original, nor, in its
principles and practice, exclusive to Leicester, the records of the London medical
officers also reveal the reason for Leicester's greater success. The simple and essential
distinction between Leicester and London lay in the achievement of the former in
introducing an effective system ofsmallpox notification. This was possible because of
the unstinted support of the local authority for the measure." The importance of
notification was widely recognized beyond Leicester before 1877,87 but social and
political pressures hindered its introduction in many areas, and in London the mul-
tiplicity ofsanitary authorities and vast population made anything less than universal
compulsory notification (something which could only be achieved by legislation)
unsatisfactory.
The London medical officers weredependent on local sources for information about
infectious disease cases, notably on the Poor Law medical officers and local
dispensaries, with local practitioners and private individuals also contributing. Much
more information was thus available about disease movements among the poorer
classes. In 1871, the Lancet observed that the London medical officers were "without
exception" entirely ignorant ofthe cases attended by private practitioners. Dr Ballard
ofIslington, however, learnt enough from private sources to satisfy him that smallpox
was widely sown among all classes ofthe community; but that the upper classes were
very generally protecting themselves by re-vaccination.8' Although a medical officer
of such exceptional energy and calibre as Dudfield of Kensington might strive over
fifteen years to establish a system of voluntary notification in his district,89 for the
most part familiarity with the general disease condition ofthe poorer quarters had to
be accepted as sufficient. Until the Infectious Diseases Notification Act came into
operation in 1890, therefore, the London preventive organization was without reliable
official information on disease incidence in the capital, other than what could be
deduced from mortality statistics.
The absence of notification was well recognized as a serious obstacle to the success
ofthe "stamping out" policy in London," and pressure mounted for its institution on
a compulsory, national basis from the early 1870s.91 In the meantime, however, a
"* Fraser, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 315, 325. Leicester was also a much smaller city than London, and
control correspondingly easier.
'7 Annual reports ofMedical Officers: Paddington, 1870-1, p. I l; St George's, HanoverSquare, 1871-2,
p.63.
u Lancet, 25 February 1871, p. 284.
'Annualreport ofMedical Officer: Kensington, 1885, p. 62-63.
9Thomas Orme Dudfield, Twosanitaryaddresses, London, 1889, pp. 5, 1 1.
9' J. L. Brand, Doctors and thestate, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, p. 60.
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group of London medical officers had gained a signal victory in the cause of preven-
tion, which was to be of the greatest importance in the public health history of
London, not only in respect of smallpox, but also in respect of cholera and bubonic
plague. In 1866, under the threat ofan imminent cholera epidemic, a sanitary act had
been passed which, among other measures, gave to the riverside sanitary authorities
responsibility for the sanitary condition of shipping within allocated sections of the
river.92 The City of London, the only authority to do so, immediately appointed a
special officer to inspect the shipping within its jurisdiction, which covered the
northern half of the Thames, between the Temple and the Tower. The City medical
officer, and the medical officers of both the Dreadnought hospital ship and the
Customs, were already convinced ofthe need for uniformity ofaction along the whole
course of the river, relating particularly to the sanitary condition of ships, and to the
importation ofcommunicabledisease.93
In 1871, when cholera was epidemic in Eastern Europe, and there were serious fears
of its importation, the sanitary authorities abutting on the Thames tried to meet the
"shipping difficulty" byjoint action, providing a staffofofficers and a hospital ship in
case of need. However, because of the faulty drafting, the common drawback to
nineteenth-century sanitary legislation, their actions proved to be illegal, a difficulty
that they were unable to overcome. An appeal to the President of the Local Govern-
ment Board resulted, by section 20 ofthe 1872 Public Health Act, in the establishment
ofport sanitary authorities,94 including the Port ofLondon Sanitary Authority, which
entered on its duties in mid-1873..The establishment of the port sanitary authority
filled a crucial gap in thecapital's sanitary defences. Already in July 1873, the medical
officer prevented an outbreak of cholera in East London, when the steamship Iris
from Hamburg came into port with cholera cases on board.95 The task ofsanitary ins-
pection and disease prevention that he had undertaken was no mean one: at this time
some 25,000 vessels arrived in the Port yearly, in addition to which there were some
2,300 sailing vessels and 4,000 "dumb-barges" belonging to the port." In its first full
year ofactivity, the port sanitary authority inspected a total of 13,846 vessels.'7
The proceedings of the port sanitary authority in the first ten years of its existence
were more exploratory and experimental than coherent in pursuit of an established
policy. In these years, the rapid development ofcommunications, with the opening of
the Suez Canal, the extension of the world railway system, and the emergence ofthe
steamship to dominance on the seas, demonstrated the need for a comprehensive and
flexible system ofhealth controls as an integral part of port entry procedure. London
was at this time, by way of the Thames, in "almost hourly communication" with the
Baltic and Mediterranean ports,9' while experience showed that infectious diseases
cheerfully travelled 14,000 miles (from Melbourne or Calcutta, for instance) by
92 Sanitary Act (1866), 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, sec. 32.
93 Henry Letheby, Report on thesanitary inspection ofshipping, 1868, pp. 6, 9.
94Annualreport ofMedical Officer: CityofLondon, 1870-1, p. 50.
9" Half-yearly report ofMedical Officer: Port ofLondon, December 1873, p. 11.
96 Annual report ofMedical Officer: CityofLondon, 1870-1, p. 50.
97 Half-yearly report ofMedicalOfficer: Port ofLondon, December 1874, appendix D.
" Ibid., December 1873, p. 21.
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steamship, keeping active by propagation among crew and passengers during the
voyage." Early in his appointment, the port medical officer became aware that
London was being made a port-of-call for large emigrant ships, which came from
Continental ports where cholera was known to be present: at his request, the ship's
brokers were to inform him promptly of the arrival of ships, so that he might board
them between Southend and Gravesend, to examine systematically both crew and
passengers without complicating commercial interests by detaining the ship; in these
years, working relations were also established with the Metropolitan Asylums
Board.'00 From time to time, during these years, the medical officer complained ofthe
inadequacy of his staff:10' it was not until 1884 that the staff and facilities at his
disposal were arranged to his satisfaction.
The establishment of the port sanitary authorities was one of the two great
administrative advances in preventive medicine under the 1872 Public Health Act, the
other being the creation of the provincial medical officerships under the aegis of new
urban and rural sanitary authorities.'02 The impact ofthe new medical officers on the
public health outside London remains, as yet, an unexplored field. The London
MOHs were, however, within a decade, drawing attention to the superiority of the
provincial administration over that ofthe capital in the area ofdisease control.'03 The
provincial cities were at an advantage because they possessed a unified sanitary
administration supervised and controlled by the city MOH and under the ultimate
control ofthe town council, whereas the administration ofthe sanitary acts in London
was divided between some forty local authorities, and more MOHs. Dr Dudfield, for
example, giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Smallpox and Fever
Hospitals in 1882, stated that in hisjudgement the "long continuance" ofsmallpox in
London was due, among other things, "generally to the lack of solidarity in the
sanitary administration of the capital".'°0 Every other large centre ofpopulation had
but one sanitary authority. In the provinces, cases of smallpox were reported and
isolated, and the epidemic prevalence of the disease prevented, with the result that,
since MOHs were appointed to all parts, smallpox had not, to his knowledge, been
prevalent in any town or other place with the severity so common in the absence of
such arrangements in the epidemic of 1870-3. "Everyone", he observed, "is interested
in stamping out smallpox."'05
In those towns incorporating a port sanitary authority, the interest in stamping out
smallpox extended to an even wider area than elsewhere. Except where special port
sanitary authorities were constituted by the Local Government Board, the local town
council or equivalent took over responsibility for the sanitary arrangements of the
port. Thus the town councils of Bristol and Liverpool, for example, were also the
sanitary authorities for thoseports,'06 while thespecially constituted Tyne Port Sanitary
" Ibid., June 1877, pp. 13-14.
00 Ibid., December 1874, p. 90.
101 Ibid., December 1873, p. 10; June 1875, p. 11.
102 Public Health Act(1872), 75 & 76 Vict. c. 79, sec. 3, 20.
103 Dudfield, op. cit., note 90 above, p. 12.
104PP. 1882, XXIX, p. 362.
0' Ibid.
'" Fifteenth annual report ofthe Local Government Board, PP. 1886, XXXI, appendix K, Table 89, pp.
287-291.
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Authority (1881) covered the ports ofNewcastle, Gateshead, Tynemouth, Jarrow, and
South Shields.'07 Under both types ofauthority, however, the town's MOH generally
also held the medical officership of the port, as did David Davies at Bristol; for the
Tyne ports, the MOH for Newcastle was in charge of port sanitary affairs. For the
first decade of their existence, the port sanitary authorities operated on an experi-
mental basis.
The powers which the port sanitary authorities exercised in cases of infectious
disease were greater in several respects than those of the authorities on land at this
period. Under the Quarantine Act, all infectious disease on board vessels (excluding
coasters) entering a port was to be reported to Customs, who detained such vessels
until their release was recommended by the officer of the sanitary authority.'", The
Public Health Act 1875 made possible the compulsory removal to hospital of every
patient suffering from an infectious disease on shipboard, and enabled the port
sanitary authorities, subject to the approval ofthe Local Government Board, to make
regulations for the compulsory notification and isolation of infectious disease cases,
and disinfection. Ships and vessels in harbour were subject to thejurisdiction of the
local sanitary authority in the same manner as houses. Finally, in 1885, the Public
Health (Shipping) Act explicitly extended the ordinary powers ofthe local authorities
in respect of infectious disease, granted in the 1875 Act, to the port sanitary
authorities. These provisions enabled port medical officers to cleanse and disinfect
where they considered it necessary to check the spread of infectious diseases; to
destroy infected bedding, etc.; to removethose without proper lodging or accommoda-
tion to hospital when suffering from a dangerous infectious disease. Port sanitary
authorities could make regulations for the removal to hospital of infected persons
brought in by ships; might impose a penalty for the exposure of infected persons and
articles, and for the letting oflodgings in houses where infectious disease existed. They
were empowered to provide hospitals; to recover the cost of hospital maintenance
from patients; and to provide freely a temporary supply of medicine and medical
attendance for poor persons in theirdistricts.'09
The success of the port sanitary authorities in controlling the entry of dangerous
infectious diseases into their districts is not easy to assess without further local
research. The annual published mortality figures of the Registrar-General, which
clearly indicate that smallpox was epidemic rather than endemic in most provincial
ports except Liverpool by 1870, and in all such ports after 1877, are often misleading.
The case of Liverpool illustrates the point. The Registrar-General's figures suggest
that the disease was all but absent in theperiod 1877-1906. There are some half-dozen
deaths recorded in 1882-6, and a few in 1902. These figures, however, relate to the
Liverpool registration district only, and must be considered in conjunction with the
figures for Toxteth Park and West Derby, both of which contained workhouse
hospitals used by Liverpool Corporation for infectious disease cases. According to the
107 H. E. Armstrong, Port sanitary administration on the Tyne, 1888, p. 3. This essay previously appeared
as an article in Public Health, June 1888.
108Quarantine Act (1825), 60 George IV c. 78, secs. IX, XIV, XVI; Armstrong, op. cit., note 107 above,
p.2.
'" Public Health Act (1875), 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, secs. 110, 120, 121, 124-126, 128, 130, 131-133. Public
Health (Shipping) Act (1885), 48 & 49 Vict. c. 35.
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mortality and notification records of the city's MOH, smallpox was very constantly
present in Liverpool in the years after 1877, and the dangers of imported disease for
the city were clearly recognized: in 1871, for example, smallpox had been introduced
by Spanish sailors.110 Local trends in mortality as they appear in the Registrar-
General's annual reports should be treated with caution.
TABLE 10: SMALLPOX DEATHS IN LIVERPOOL 1871-1881, ACCORDING TO
DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES
1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881
Registrar-General 819 14 6 7 10 70 37 - - - -
1882 Commission 1,919 50 10 30 29 386 299 3 - - 44
MOH, 1896 1,919 50 10 30 29 386 299 3 - 2 34
With this reservation, the incidence ofsmallpox in the ports of England and Wales
is still interesting, because, especially after the end of the epidemic of 1870-3, the
disease often appears in the ports when it is absent (according to the mortality figures
at least) from their hinterland. Thus, in 1887-8, when there was a total of85 deaths in
Bristol/Barton Regis, there were no deaths from the disease elsewhere in
Gloucestershire. The 163 smallpox deaths in Swansea in 1870 were unique in South
Wales. In all, the outbreaks of smallpox recorded in the mortality statistics were
increasingly confined to the ports and the manufacturing towns in the latter years of
the century. In the years after 1884, also, the previously persistent smallpox mortality
across the London hinterland fades away, suggesting that control measures taken in
the capital were indeed limiting thespread ofthedisease, when it occurred, beyond the
city.
The activity ofthe port sanitary authorities in respect ofthe dangerous communic-
able diseases may well have been most effective. The absence of cholera after 1866,
and the failure of plague to spread in the country at the turn ofthe century, are both
important illustrations oftheir effectiveness. The Port and Riparian Sanitary Survey,
undertaken by the Local Government Board in the shadow of the cholera scare of
1893, found that although general sanitary arrangements could only be called
satisfactory in two-thirds ofthe sixty port sanitary districts, the arrangements for the
medical inspection of vessels and persons were satisfactory in all but five. In certain
districts, among which were numbered London, Tyne, Hull and Goole, Southampton,
Plymouth, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, and Liverpool, the arrangements were not only
"highly satisfactory" in themselves, but were carried out with a "devotion to duty on
the part ofthe medical officers ofhealth" such as was regarded as contributing to the
"marked success" with which imported cholera was controlled at all English ports in
1892 and 1893.111 The port medical officers, then, could be very effective when the
occasion demanded, and the evidence suggests that smallpox was a focus of their
vigilance and concern throughout theperiod, even ifthey were not always successful in
preventing the entry ofthe disease. The MOH for Hull, for example, observed sadly,
after a severe type of smallpox had become epidemic in the city in 1899, that, "The
sl°Royal Commission on Vaccination, Finalreport, appendix XIII, PP. 1897, XLVI, pp. 284, 286.
II Portandripariansanitarysurvey, PP. 1895, LII, pp. vi-vii.
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great emigrant traffic through this city and port, especially from Southern Russia,
may, in spite of all the vigilance ofthe authority, have contributed a source ofinfec-
tion, for among the emigrants, persons had been frequently recognised as having
recently had smallpox, and possibly the means of their disinfection had not been
altogether efficient."1112
The sphere of interest of the port sanitary authorities extended widely beyond the
confines oftheir ports. Dr Collingridge ofthe Port ofLondon, for example, visited Le
Havre, Antwerp, and Rotterdam in 1874, to discover what kind ofdisease procedures
operated in the ports of France, Holland, and Belgium."3 Careful attention was paid
to thedisease condition in ports ofcontact both at home and abroad. On the Tyne, for
example, the medical and daily press, the Shipping Gazette, and otherjournals were
examined daily for information ofdisease abroad. A list ofvessels bound for theTyne
from infected ports was kept, in which was entered the name of the ship, the date of
her passing different ports on the voyage, and her expected time of arrival. Ships on
this register were visited without delay on arrival by thesanitary officers. On boarding
any vessel, they also interrogated the captain for information of infectious disease in
his port oforigin."14
Under normal circumstances, however, the sanitary authorities relied upon the
officers of Customs for information about suspicious cases on ships entering port.
Henry Armstrong, the highly efficient Medical Officer for the Tyne ports, recorded in
vivid note form thedetails ofthis procedure. Once notified by Customs,
The assistant on duty calls up the chiefinspector, goes for the assistant medical officer and calls on the
crew ofthe launch to get up steam. The chiefinspector accompanies the assistant medical officer to the
vessel, who finding the case to be one, e.g. of smallpox, gives certificate and order for its removal to
hospital, and after examining the crew, recommends re-vaccination, which, if agreed to, he performs.
The chiefinspector gives instructions to thecaptain that none oftheship's company is to leave the vessel;
takes the assistant medical officer on shore; puts fumigation materials (sulphur, charcoal, and a brazier)
into launch; telephones the medical officer ofhealth, and sends word to the hospital to prepare; visits the
ship with an assistant; removes the patient and his effects to hospital in the launch, leaving the assistant
to fumigate. Afterwards meets the medical officer ofhealth and takes him in the launch to thehospital to
see the patient. Gives him history ofthe case as obtained from thecaptain, and receives his instructions.
Lands the M.O.H. [sic]; returns to the ship and obtains the captain's guarantee for maintenance ofthe
patient. When fumigation is completed, gives a certificate to that effect to the captain, and leaves at the
Custom House a similar certificate, so that the vessel may be cleared. The fore-cabin of the launch in
which the patient is removed is then fumigated. Sees to the thorough cleansing ofthe vessel from which
the case came; keeps her under supervision whilst in port; and advises the authorities ofthe British port,
or the British Consul ofthe foreign port, forwhich she sets sail on leaving theTyne."'
The procedure followed by other port sanitary authorities was probably very
similar. Among the duties that the MOH for the Port of London listed for his depart-
ment (a list that became a textbook to outport sanitary authorities throughout the
kingdom), were: the inspection of all inhabited vessels in the port with respect to the
cleanliness of the crew's quarters, ventilation, closet accommodation and state of
bilges, drinking-water supply, and water tanks; the removal of cases of infectious or
contagious disease; the removal, if required, ofvessels to isolated moorings; fumiga-
tion of vessels; disinfection of clothing; and disinfection of persons dead at sea or
112 McVail, op. cit., note 8 above, p. 11.
113 Half-yearlyreport ofMedicalOfficer: PortofLondon, June 1874, p. 62.
114Armstrong, op. cit., note 107 above, p. 16.
"I Ibid.,p. 13.
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abroad of infectious or contagious disease.116 The immensity of such a task becomes
apparent when the numbers ofships passing through the Port ofLondon is considered.
In the 1870s, an average of 14,000 vessels were inspected annually in the Port; in the
early 1880s this rose to 22,000, but fell again to around 14,000 by the end of the
decade. From the second part of 1893, numbers began to increase again, and by the
end ofthecentury over 30,000 ships were inspected annually."17
After cholera, smallpox was perhaps the most urgent concern of the port sanitary
authorities. Most of the examples of the work of his authority given by Armstrong
relate to smallpox, while the disease figures repeatedly in the annual reports of Dr
Collingridge. Armstrong, relating the work of his department in the years 1881-7,
catalogued the principal preventive concerns ofthese years. In 1881, smallpox seemed
likely to be brought to the Tyne from Yarmouth and elsewhere; enteric fever from
Middlesbrough. In 1882, and for some years subsequently, watch was kept for ships
from cholera-infected localities. In this year, the department was warned of a ship
which had landed a smallpox case at Falmouth and was proceeding to the Tyne, where
one of the crew was found to have the disease. Similar information about smallpox
came from London and Yarmouth, and because of information received from the
newspapers and from captains, watch was kept for thedisease on vessels arriving from
Rouen, Bilbao, and Fecamp. In 1883, two coasting vessels brought two cases ofsmall-
pox into Newcastle by way ofthe river, and watch was also kept for the disease from
Rotterdam and Riga, as well as cholera from the East. In 1884, five ships arrived from
cholera ports, and one infected with "African coast fever". In 1885, the prevalence of
smallpox and yellow and enteric fevers gave much extra work in watching out for
arrivals. In 1886, the notification of infectious disease by masters of vessels was
made compulsory on the Tyne. In 1887, several incoming ships were infected with
smallpox.""
The constant anxiety over the introduction of smallpox through the Tyne ports
undoubtedly sprang from fear of epidemic consequences in the local population:
Armstrong specifically noted the "danger of infection being brought to the popula-
tion of Tyneside"."19 This anxiety may not seem to be totally substantiated by the
figures presented: between 1881 and 1887, there were seventeen smallpox cases
admitted to the Floating Hospital, with three deaths. However, ifthe high infectivity
of the disease is borne in mind, these figures take on more significance: in 1884, for
example, the medical officer for the London parish ofNewington traced seventy-nine
cases of smallpox originating from two cases in one household.'20 The figures for
infectious disease cases in the Port of London, similarly, do not seem strikingly high,
in view of the number of incoming vessels (Table 11).
The role of the ports in providing a means of entry for smallpox into Britain was
indirectly discussed by McVail in 1919. McVail, discussing the existence of two
different types of imported smallpox in the British epidemics of the early twentieth
century (a severe strain from Africa that probably travelled by way of Europe to
116 Half-yearly report ofthe Medical Officer: PortofLondon, June 1874, p. 56-57.
17 Half-yearly reports ofthe Medical Officer: Port ofLondon.
"'Armstrong, op. cit., note 107 above, p. 16-18.
119 Ibid., p. 18.
120Annualreport ofthe MedicalOfficer: Newington, 1884-5, p. 126.
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TABLE 11: CASES OF SMALLPOX IN THE PORTOF LONDON, 1884-1901121
1884 21 1893 31
1885 21 1894 16
1886 10 1895 30
1887 27 1896 15
1888 12 1897 27
1889 5 1898 12
1890 10 1899 12
1891 22 1900 16
1892 17 1901 14
England, and a very mild strain originating in America), gave a number ofexamples
oftheir introduction in the years after 1900.122 He also recorded a rough geographical
breakdown ofthe smallpox cases notified in Britain in the years 1911-1917, although
he gave no further explanation ofthe figures with respect to, for example, the number
ofprimary and secondary cases.
TABLE 12: SMALLPOX CASES NOTIFIED IN BRITAIN, 1911-1917123
Year 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Total 295 123 115 65 90 149 5
No. in port towns 20 72 48 10 31 55 2
No. in port sanitary
districts 30 12 25 7 12 14 1
These figures, according to McVail, provide "very striking evidence" ofthe reduced
infectivity of smallpox: the disease obtained almost no hold in the country, although
repeatedly introduced at seaports.'24 It might also be suggested that the efficiency of
the port sanitary authorities contributed in limiting the possibilities ofinfection. The
rediscovery ofthe importance of international communication in the transmission of
disease occurred at a time when technological improvements were beginning to
accelerate the pace of such activity. From the early 1870s, British sanitary observers
were able to trace the progress of epidemic disease across the world with greater
accuracy than ever before. Local monitoring of foreign disease movements, as
described above, was made possible, for example, by the development of the
telegraph, which immeasurably increased the speed with which information ofdisease
outbreaks could travel. Further, the Registrar-General, after "persevering applica-
tion", succeeded in inducing the authorities ofParis, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, Bombay,
Madras, Calcutta, and New York to furnish him with weekly mortality returns
similar to, though "less complete" than, those of London. Thus, "immediate intima-
tion is given of any epidemic arising in [sic] the horizon, even when the cloud is no
bigger than a man's hand."''2 This new source of information, combined with the
institution ofport sanitary authorities and ofthe provincial medical officers ofhealth,
finally completed the basic structure of British sanitary protection. As a result, and
121 Half-yearly reports ofthe MedicalOfficer: Port ofLondon.
122 McVail, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 9-12.
123 Ibid., p. 24.
124 Ibid.
125 Thirty-fourth annual reportoftheRegistrar-General, PP. 1873, XX, p. 48.
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because of the novelty of these arrangements, the late 1870s and early 1880s were a
period ofparticular anxiety for thepreventive authorities.
The connexion between seaports and smallpox was first specifically observed in
England in the epidemic of 1870-2. This epidemic was the worst since registration
began, certainly the worst since the first establishment of preventive authorities.
Although the severity of the disease had been increasing in England in the 1860s, no
previous experience had prepared even experienced medical men for the mortality of
1871. The virulent strain of 1871 was undoubtedly introduced from abroad. The
disease was violently epidemic in France at this time: the Registrar-General noted that
the epidemic might be traced "to foreign communications beyond doubt", instancing
more particularly the "large arrivals" ofrefugees (from the Franco-Prussian War) in
the late autumn of 1870, and "distinct evidence" ofthe introduction ofthedisease into
seaside towns, especially Southampton and Grimsby. Significantly, London and
Liverpool were the first places ofany importance to feel the effects ofthe epidemic.'26
Smallpox was epidemic again in London in 1876-7, 1881, and 1884-5. On these occa-
sions, there are no indications ofthedisease being introduced from abroad. In Decem-
ber 1876, the port medical officer reported that although smallpox was widely
epidemic in London, it had so far manifested itself in the floating population to "an
infinitesimal extent".1"2 Nevertheless, at this time, "even in ordinary circumstances",
the port sanitary staff, however hard they tried, could not cover all the arrivals as the
medical officer thought they should:'28evidently there was scope here for the introduc-
tion of infection from abroad. In 1881, although smallpox was epidemic in the
metropolis, the cases occurring in the port were few in number and "quite isolated".
There were six imported cases.129
The smallpox epidemics occurring in London in 1876, 1881, and 1884 cannot with
certainty be traced to infection from abroad: it is possible that thestrain introduced in
1870 was working itself out with diminishing virulence, and that the port sanitary
authorities were successful in preventing its refreshment from abroad. In 1878 and
1882, they were almost certainly instrumental in preventing the entry ofsevere foreign
strains of the disease. In 1878, there was a "fearful epidemic" in several Brazilian
ports, and as many vessels from ports on the north-east coast ofSouth America came
to London to discharge at the Victoria or South West India docks, there was some
alarm.'30 In the late summer of 1882, much anxiety was caused by an epidemic of
severe smallpox (designated "blackpox" by the port medical officer) at the Cape of
Good Hope. Again, a large amount of shipping was constantly arriving from the
colony, but there is no evidence of the disease being spread into London or its
hinterland.'3' The difficulty with which such a result was achieved is suggested by an
instance in 1883, when a vessel from Seaham Harbour, County Durham, came into
port with a case ofsemi-confluent smallpox on board. The vessel was fumigated, and
vaccination offered to the crew, who "as usual" refused.'32
126 Ibid., p. 31.
127Half-yearly report ofthe MedicalOfficer: PortofLondon, December 1876, p. 9.
12. Ibid.
129 Ibid., June 1881,p.4. 131 Ibid., December 1882, p. 8.
130 Ibid., December 1878, p. 15. 132 Ibid., June 1883, p. 14.
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The alarms caused by smallpox in 1878 and 1882, by plague in 1878, and by cholera
in 1883, resulted, at the beginning of 1884, in the institution of a system designed
specifically to detect all cases of infectious disease entering the port. Co-operation
between port authorities across the country was well established, and producing
extremely good results: no vessel could free itself from sanitary inspection by leaving
one port for another, since her port ofdestination would be notified before arrival."'
Nevertheless, one of the greatest difficulties of the port medical officer remained the
"short-sighted policy ofmasters ofvessels in attempting to conceal cases ofinfectious
disease".'34 From the beginning of 1884, compulsory notification of all cases of
infectious disease within two hours oftheir appearance was introduced, reinforced by
a £5 penalty in the port sanitary district. Copies ofthese regulations were distributed
by the Customs on boarding at Gravesend. In the first six months ofthe operation of
the scheme, the medical officer had no cases of wilful concealment to report."35
Armstrong, in Newcastle, reported similar experiences, and, apparently, similar
success with notification.'36
The establishment of a system ofcompulsory notification in the Port of London in
1884 had little effect on the epidemic of smallpox that began in east London in late
1883. Again, there is no indication that the disease was introduced from abroad, but it
might easily have been. The evidence of the 1884-5 epidemic, indeed, underlines the
difficulty, previous to universal compulsory notification, of controlling smallpox
once it had become established in the capital, before the epidemic had run its natural
course. Although the Metropolitan Asylums Board reorganized their services
and introduced the hospital ships in March 1884, the total mortality figures for
London show that the disease continued to be very active in 1885, although escalation
was minimal. The remarkable reduction in smallpox mortality that occurred in 1886,
and continued with interruptions thereafter, is coincident not only with the introduc-
tion ofthe hospital ships, but also with the introduction ofcompulsory notification in
the Port of London, and with generally tighter preventive controls on shipping enter-
ing British ports with the implementation ofthe Public Health (Shipping) Act of 1885.
Unfortunately, the elucidation of differing mortality in different years, especially
with regard to individual cities, is difficult, given the absence ofsystematic statistical
mortality plus incidence series in this period. Various sets of official figures dealing
with differential mortality in local epidemics exist, such as for the outbreaks of small-
pox at Sheffield (1887-8), and in Leicester, Gloucester, Dewsbury, and Warrington in
1892-3.'" None of these cities is a port, however, and although further local studies
may discover such data for Bristol, Liverpool, or Newcastle, the series ofthe MAB for
London seems to be the only readily accessible source for the examination ofspecific
case-mortality from smallpox in non-epidemic years. Although the reliability of the
figures in the following table may be affected by the decreasing rigour of the
Managers' admissions policy,'38 thegeneral trend remains ofinterest.
133 Ibid. 134 Ibid., June 1884, p. 9. 13-3 Ibid.
1'6 Armstrong, op. cit., note 107 above, p. 17-18.
'37 PP. 1896, XLVII, pp. 55-58, 69.
"'3Ayers, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 118. From 1871 to 1878, admissions to the hospitals were legally
limited to the destitute; 1879-86, regulations relaxed slightly; 1887-91, regulations further relaxed;
1892-1900, all restrictive regulations removed.
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TABLE 13: ADMISSIONS OF SMALLPOX PATIENTS, AND MORTALITY PER CENT
OF SMALLPOX PATIENTS TREATED IN THE MAB HOSPITALS, 1871-1903'39
Year Admissions Mortality %
1870-1 (2 months) 582 20.81
1871-2 13,139 18.95
1872-3 2,359 17.84
1873-4 174
1874 112 17.02
1875 89 J
1876 2,134 21.64
1877 6,516 17.92
1878 4,558 17.99
1879 1,628 15.69
1880 1,982 15.95
1881 8,551 16.61
1882 1,799 12.96
1883 598 16.06
1884 6,363 15.98
1885 6,146 15.80
1886 99 22.22
1887 36 0
1888 62 12.90
1889 5 0
1890 22 13.64
1891 63 12.70
1892 325 11.29
1893 2,376 7.64
1894 1,117 8.87
1895 941 6.36
1896 190 4.01
1897 70 18.44
1898 5 0
1899 18 20.69
1900 66 4.3
1901 1,743 18.51
1902 7,916 16.60
1903 355 3.4
Thefluctuations in the apparent fatality ofthe disease as shown in this table become
much more marked after 1886, and this pattern is generally confirmed (although the
two groups, total admissions and unvaccinated, do not necessarily conform to a con-
sistent pattern) ifthe available case-mortality figures for "unvaccinated" patients are
examined (Table 14).
In general, the case-mortality oftotal admissions in the period 1870-1888 seems to
reflect the endemic character ofthe disease in London; fatality lifts at the beginning of
the epidemic in 1876, as it had presumably done in the period 1 December 1870 to 3
February 1871, at the start of the great epidemic of 1870. The epidemic of 1881,
however, shows only a slightly increased fatality rate; in 1884 the fatality of the
disease diminished, despite a markedly increased prevalence. The general level of
"' Annualreports oftheStatistical CommitteeoftheMetropolitan Asylums Board, 1886-1903.
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TABLE 14: CASE-MORTALITY AMONG UNVACCINATED PATIENTS AT THE MAB
HOSPITALS, 1888-19031'
Year Mortalitypercent of
"unvaccinated" cases
(not including "doubtfully
vaccinated")
1888 27.2
1889 0
1890 0
1891 31.25
1892 27.41
1893 18.8
1894 22.2
1895 13.6
1896 12.5
1897 30.76
1898 0
1899 0
1900 14.28
1901 31.99
1902 33.06
1903 4.6
fatality at this period, at around 15-17 per cent, is noticeably higher, as well as more
consistent, than the fatality rate in the years after 1886-7. Some extraordinary
influence mayhave been at work in 1886: the MAB themselves appear to have con-
sidered the years 1886-1891 inclusive as uncharacteristic, since the table which
provides the source for these figuresgives only an average fatality rate(14.28 per cent)
for these years.141 The fact that this period was one in which the admissions policy was
more relaxed than formerly, but still operating under restrictive regulations as it did
not after 1892, may be relevant, but it is perhaps morelikely that the average was con-
sidered to give a better indication of the general trend of smallpox mortality after
1885.
The case-fatality figures for the "unvaccinated" appear to demonstrate that the
disease, although diminished in prevalence, the number ofcases being small relative to
previous experience, still operated in a virulent form in certain years, notably in
1891-2, 1897, and 1901-2. It may be that other factors were at work in 1891 at least,
since the average case-fatality rate is not especially high in that year: perhaps the pre-
valence of the disease among the vagrant class in London, striking at an almost
certainly undernourished group with diminished resistance, raised the fatality rate
among the "unvaccinated" into which group the majority of such victims probably
fell.
The examples presented by McVail suggest that smallpox was no longer indigenous
by the beginning of the twentieth century. The epidemic outbreaks to which he refers
were all reported to be imported. The case-fatality rate in the Hull epidemic of
1899-1900, described above, was 17.3 per cent; in 1903-4, Hull, sharing in the
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
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provincial epidemic, suffered a case-fatality rate of only 5.4 per cent. In Glasgow the
epidemic of 1900, imported from Bombay, had a fatality of 12.5 per cent; but that
which began in September 1903, introduced by navvies from Peeblesshire, had a
fatality of 7.6 per cent. Severe smallpox at Bristol in 1908 was imported from the Sea
of Azov, in 1915 from Spain. Very mild smallpox was imported into Nottingham
from America in 1901 by visitors to the Mormon conference there. In Lancashire at
this time it was recorded that smallpox outbreaks could be traced to two sources: to
cases imported from America, which were of a mild type, and to an infection that
came from Paris via London, which was much more severe.142 Smallpox at Liverpool
in 1902 was principally introduced by men from American cattle ships, which traded
regularly with the city. The disease was introduced by way of the port in December
1901, but, because of the "excellent sanitary arrangements" of the Liverpool health
department, it made little headway until November 1902, when a concealed or
unnotified case in a poor part of the town led to a local outbreak. Although the
sanitary authority took "prompt measures", these failed to control the disease, which
by early 1903 assumed epidemic proportions. From 6 December 1901 to the end of
1902, some 552 cases of smallpox became known; between January and June 1903,
1,585; from June to December 1903, 141. These figures do not include some thirty-
three cases found on vessels arriving at Liverpool port, although these cases were
removed from their ships to the city's infectious disease hospital.'43 During the
epidemic outbreak, four Corporation hospitals were used for smallpox cases: it was
considered that these were, in a "material degree", responsible for the considerable
and sustained prevalence ofthe disease in the city.'"
The pattern ofsmallpox incidence in London and the provinces in the 1890s and the
early years of the twentieth century suggests that the disease probably still
occasionally entered the country undetected resulting in sporadic outbreaks, but that,
as an endemic disease, it was exerting very little or no influence. In London, the six
years of very low incidence and further diminished mortality between the epidemics of
1884-5 and 18924, together with the unprecedented nil mortality of 1889, mark a
decided change in the character of smallpox in the city. The admissions to the MAB
hospitals in 1893, at the peak of this epidemic, would not have ranked as of epidemic
proportions in the 1870s. After 1894, there was a further period of six years before
smallpox, this time indisputably introduced from abroad, again became epidemic. The
experience of London in the epidemic outbreak of 1901 suggests the feasibility of this
interpretation. The history of the epidemic reveals both the strengths and weaknesses
of the London preventive organization in respect of smallpox. A severe strain of the
disease reached epidemic proportions on the Continent, particularly in Paris, during
1901. The London preventive organization was put on special alert against the
introduction of the disease; a precaution which resulted more than once in the course
of the summer in the detection of imported smallpox, and the speedy limitation of its
spread.'45 Severe strains of the disease had been threatening Britain since at least
142 McVail, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 9-12.
143 Annual report ofthe Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1906, XXXVI, appendix A, no.
1o,p. 157.
I"Ibid.,p. 176.
14' Annualreport ofthe Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1902, XXXVII, p.435.
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1895, when there was a serious outbreak in Calcutta, and by 1900 it was ravaging
Bombay and Cairo. Already in 1900 a group of eighteen cases in Hackney had been
found to have their origin in Jerusalem,'" while the London notification records
showed that the greater number of primary cases occurring in the years 1900-1 were
imported from abroad.'47
While the introduction of severe smallpox into London in 1901 was perhaps not
inevitable, the events in Liverpool in 1902 related above illustrate the real difficulty of
successfully maintaining a sustained preventive cordon against therepeated challenges
ofa highly infectious disease like smallpox. In August 1901, there finally occurred, in
the south of St Pancras parish and contiguous areas, an outbreak ofsmallpox whose
source could not with certainty be traced. From this base, the epidemic spread
outward to affect many, though not all, of the metropolitan boroughs. North of the
river, those principally affected were St Pancras, St Marylebone, Shoreditch, Bethnal
Green, Stepney, Poplar, and Hackney; south of the river, Bermondsey, Southwark,
Battersea, and Camberwell.'4" In this emergency, the London preventive organization
proved fully adequate to limiting the disease not only to metropolitan London, but
even to areas within the city. Not a few boroughs were virtually exempt from the
disease throughout the epidemic, and the medical officer of the Local Government
Board felt that there could "indeed be no doubt at all" that the efficiency ofthe MAB
as both hospital authority and ambulance service contributed largely to the success
in combating London smallpox. Theepidemic was virtually over by August 1902.149
Although smallpox did succeed in entering London and establishing a hold upon the
community in 1901, it did so only after repeated attempts, and at a time when the port
preventive service was under considerable strain. There was very grave concern at this
time that plague or cholera, or both, both epidemic in places within the London
trading area, might be imported."30 In addition, the infectious nature of smallpox,
combined with its twelve-day incubation period, made it a more difficult subject for
preventive control than the other two diseases. The vigilance of the port sanitary
authorities was sharpened by the experiences of 1901-3. Although the American type
of smallpox (variola minor alastrim) became increasingly dominant globally, and
indeed began to extend in Britain from 1919, to reach epidemic proportions in 1923,1"'
variola majordid not again become seriously epidemic. Severe types ofsmallpox con-
tinued to be active in various European countries in the early decades ofthe twentieth
century, notably in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Russia,"12 and con-
tinued to be recognized as a danger to Britain. McVail warned that, ... constant
intercourse between the United Kingdom and the Continent maintains adegree ofrisk
which prevents any sense ofsecurity against successful invasion by thedisease."'53 The
'" Annualreport ofthe MedicalOfficerforLondon, 1900, p. 16.
147J. F. J. Sykes, Smallpox in London, London, P. S. King, 1901, pp. 3-5.
148Annualreport ofthe Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1902, XXXVI, p. 436.
"' Ibid., p. 439.
"'Annual report of Medical Officer: Local Government Board, PP. 1902, XXXVII, pp. xlii-xlv;
appendix A, nos. 18-20.
"' Dixon, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 21 1.
1" McVail, op. cit., note 8 above, p. 25-26.
"I Ibid., p. 26.
137Anne Hardy
British preventive establishment in the early twentieth century continued to be alert to
the possible import ofvirulent smallpox from abroad.
There can be little doubt that the story of the decline of smallpox mortality in
Britain is more complex than allowed for by those who accept the simple vaccination
explanation. The variations in virulence of the disease certainly complicate the
elucidation of the problem of the other factors involved. It is clear, however, that
vaccination (and inoculation) per se, because of prejudice, apathy, ignorance, and
absence ofenforced re-vaccination, could never have been the sole instrument in the
disappearance of the disease. Other measures were widely used to control the spread
of smallpox in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century; and were generally
accepted in preventive circles as being essential in achieving any degree ofsuccess. As
late as 1901, the principal measure against smallpox in England was still the "isola-
tion in detail' of sick persons."'4 The establishment in the 1870s and early 1880s of a
coherent national preventive structure was probably crucial in limiting the
opportunities for entry ofvirulent disease strains, and in raising the efficiency level of
local preventive measures. The Infectious Diseases Notification Act of 1899, which
made notification compulsory for the infectious diseases, including smallpox,
nationally, finally completed this structure.'" The institution of the port sanitary
authorities was one feature ofoutstanding importance. Without these authorities, it is
probable that Britain would have experienced epidemics of cholera, and perhaps of
plague, in the later nineteenth century, and that the battle against endemic and
epidemic smallpox in its more virulent forms would have been prolonged beyond the
early twentieth century.
SUMMARY
There can be little doubt that the story of the decline of smallpox mortality in
Britain is more complex than allowed for by those who accept the simple vaccination
explanation. The variations in virulence of the disease complicate the elucidation of
the problem of other factors involved. Smallpox was in all probability not a native
British disease, but only became endemic in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth
century, and the "native strain" was probably a mild one. Mortality may probably
have been significantly increased through the introduction of more virulent strains
from abroad. It seems reasonably clearthat vaccination (and inoculation)persecould
not have been the sole instrument in the disappearance ofthe disease, because ofpre-
judice, apathy, ignorance, and absence of enforced re-vaccination. Other measures
were widely used to control the spread of smallpox in the last thirty years of the
nineteenth century; and were generally accepted in preventive circles as being essential
in achieving any degree of success. The establishment in the 1870s and 1880s of a
coherent national preventive structure was quite possibly a decisive factor in finally
limiting the opportunities for entry of virulent disease strains, and in raising the
efficiency level of local preventive measures. The establishment of the port sanitary
authorities was a critical factor.
154 Sykes, op. cit., note 147 above, p. 9.
"' Infectious Diseases Notification Act(1899), 62 & 63 Vict. c. 8.
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